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INSURER'S MISTAKEN JUDGMENT - A
NEW TORT?
JOHN J. KIRCHER*
In days gone by when everything, including the law, was
much less complex, an insurer's breach of its contract with an
insured was treated much like any contract breach. If the in-
surer's breach was established, the insured's damages would be
determined by what the contract obligated the insurer to do.
The anxiety the insured may have sustained as a result of the
delayed payment was not, after all, a matter to which the law
of contracts addressed itself in the typical case of contract
breach.'
Now that times have changed and the law has changed with
them, insurers are exhibiting growing concern over potential
liability to insureds beyond their contractual undertakings. In
certain cases insureds are seeking compensatory damages be-
yond contract benefits as well as punitive damages from their
insurers for alleged contract breaches.
A good deal has been written about the liability of an in-
surer for its "wrongful" refusal to accept an offer by a third
party to settle a claim against its insured within the policy
limits of a liability insurance contract.2 This article will be
concerned only with the liability of an insurer leading to expo-
sure beyond its policy benefits in the handling of claims of its
own insured under so-called "first party" insurance coverages.
An insured seeking to impose liability upon its insurer be-
yond contract benefits resulting from a first party insurance
claim will typically employ one of two theories of liability: (1)
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (2) alleged
* B.A. 1960, J.D. 1963, Marquette University; Assistant Professor of Law, Mar-
quette University Law School; Faculty Advisor, MARQUETTE LAW REviEw; member,
American, Wisconsin, and Milwaukee County Bar Associations.
1. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 341 (1932).
2. The "Annotated Bibliography" in the Defense Research Institute monograph,
Insurance Law - Excess Liability (Vol. 1973 No. 3, Sept. 1973), for example, lists a
total of sixty-three law review articles on the subject.
3. First party insurance generally describes those types of insurance coverage under
which the insured (or his beneficiaries) recovers benefits directly from his own insurer
without the need to establish fault (e.g., life, fire, accident and health, and income
disability coverages).
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breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing arising from
the contract of insurance. In some cases insureds have asserted
both theories in the same action.
I. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
At least since 1936 tort commentators have recognized that
a person's interest in his own emotional tranquility is, of itself,
deserving of protection under tort principles.' The elements of
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are set
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is sub-
ject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm
to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.'
The cases in which intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress is alleged against a first party insurer involve conduct on
the part of the insurer in the claims handling process. In ac-
tions in which insureds have been successful in asserting this
theory, the insurers were found to have employed various forms
of coercion, harassment and threats against the insured in
order to minimize claim payment or completely escape their
contractual responsibility.' This course of conduct was followed
even though the obligation to pay contract benefits was clear.
An insurer's settlement tactics may be privileged and may not
subject the insurer to liability for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress when the insurer does nothing more than insist
upon its legal rights in a permissible way. 7 However, when
settlement tactics degenerate to extreme and outrageous bully-
ing of the insured, liability for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress may attach if the requisite emotional response
is sustained by the insured.8
Because of the space limitations on this article and because
4. See Magruder, Mental and Emotional Distress in the Law of Torts, 49"HARV. L.
REV. 1033 (1936).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
6. Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of America, 265 Cal. App. 2d 1058, 71 Cal. Rptr.
764 (1968); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr.
78 (1970); Eckenrode v. Life of Amer. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment g and illustration 14 at 76
(1965).
8. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 395, 89 Cal. Rptr.
78, 89 (1970).
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the cases in which insureds have been successful in employing
this theory present such clear examples to insurers of the type
of conduct which should be avoided, the discussion of this
theory of liability has been limited. In addition, it has been
thoroughly discussed elsewhere.9 Suffice it to say that a first
party insurer's decision to resist its insured's claim should be
based upon its good faith assessment that the facts, applicable
policy provisions and applicable law do not justify honoring the
claim. It should not be made "to save some money for the
company" after an assessment of the claim shows its validity.
II. DuTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAr DEALING
This writer has chosen to devote the bulk of this article to
the second of the two theories employed by first party insureds
against their insurers to impose liability beyond contractual
undertakings. As this theory has developed, it presents far
more complex and troublesome questions for insurers.
A. The California Approach
As one familiar with insurance law might expect, the theory
that a first party insurer may be liable to its insured for non-
contract damages in the event it breaches its "duty of good
faith and fair dealing" was first developed by the courts of
California. Courts in that state have a history of treating insur-
ance contracts as so much silly putty to be twisted and pulled
into what they consider to be a proper form. While the courts
of that state have ruled that insurers have a duty of good faith
and fair dealing and that breach of that duty is a tort exposing
the insurer to noncontract liability for consequential damages,
they have not seen fit to fully articulate the precise nature of
the duty so that conscientious insurers may seek to avoid liabil-
ity.
The first case to consider a first party insurer's obligation
of good faith and fair dealing was Richardson v. Employers
Liability Assurance, Corp." The plaintiffs in that action were
9. DuBois & Bronson, The Sprectre of Punitive Damages in First Party Actions,
40 INS. COUNSEL J. 290 (1973); DuBois, The Spectre of Punitive Damages in First
Party Actions II, 42 INS. COUNSEL J. 242 (1975); Miller, Recovery Beyond Property
Policy Limits - A Plaintiff View, 11 THE. FORUM 523 (1976); Houser, First-Party
Claims for More Than Insurance Policy Limits - A Defendant's Viewpoint, 11 THE
FORUM 529 (1976).
10. 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1972).
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insured by the defendant under an auto insurance policy which
provided coverage against injuries caused by uninsured motor-
ists. They were injured in an auto accident which was precipi-
tated by another motorist who ran a stop sign. Despite investi-
gation by the insurer's local claims office which indicated that
the stop sign violator was the sole cause of the accident and
that he was uninsured, the insurer's home office took a "pay
only as a last resort" attitude toward its insureds' claim for
uninsured motorist benefits. The insureds, who had sustained
over $13,000 in medical and related expenses and had only
$20,000 in uninsured motorist coverage, were forced to submit
their claim to arbitration. After the arbitration proceeding, at
which the insurer presented no evidence to dispute the claim,
the insureds were awarded the full amount of benefits due.
Nevertheless, the defendant instructed its local claims person-
nel to attempt to settle for less than the policy limits. Finally,
after judicial confirmation of the arbitration award, the insurer
paid the benefits.
Despite the eventual payment, the insureds commenced an
action against their insurer seeking compensatory and punitive
damages. In analyzing the duty of the insurer to its insureds
the court relied heavily on the case of Crisci v. Security Insur-
ance Co." That case, however, did not involve an insurer deal-
ing with a claim of its own insured, but was concerned with the
alleged bad faith of an insurer for its "unreasonable" refusal to
settle the claim of a third party within the limits of its insured's
liability insurance coverage. Crisci imposed the duty upon the
insurer to act in good faith and to deal fairly with such claims
to protect the interest of the insured. It defined "bad faith" as
acts by the insurer amounting to dishonesty, fraud, conceal-
ment, or an unwarranted or unreasonable refusal to settle the
claim.
The court in Richardson expanded upon the rationale in
Crisci to hold that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is an
implied covenant in every contract of insurance. It further held
that breach of that duty is a tort which exposes the offending
insurer to noncontract, consequential damages sustained by
the insured. It held that the insurer's refusal to pay uninsured
motorist benefits to the plaintiffs until compelled to do so was
11. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
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unwarranted and unreasonable. The insurer, therefore, had
breached its duty of good faith.
If the "rule" of Richardson could be confined to factual
settings similar to that case, insurers would have a clear course
to follow. They would be well advised to avoid assuming a
recalcitrant attitude toward claims by insureds involving ob-
vious coverage under a policy. However, the rule has been em-
ployed in other factual settings. Its application there raises
serious questions as to the precise nature of the duty owed.
Questions are also raised as to what, if anything, an insurer
may do to avoid excess exposure in a case involving questiona-
ble liability to its insured under a policy of first party insur-
ance.
Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.'2 presents an excellent
illustration of the scope of the problems. The insured in
Gruenberg had his nightclub covered by three separate fire
insurance policies. Following a fire the insured was charged
with both arson and defrauding an insurer. He alleged that an
adjuster employed by the defendants told a fire department
official that the insured carried excessive insurance on the
property. While the criminal charges were pending, an attorney
representing the insurers made a demand upon the insured to
appear and be examined concerning the fire loss. Provisions in
the fire policies gave the insurers this right of examination. 3
The insured's attorney advised the attorney for the insurers
that he had instructed his client to make no statement concern-
ing the fire while criminal charges were pending. The insurers'
attorney responded by advising that if the insured did not ap-
pear as demanded, the insurers would treat this as a breach of
the contracts of insurance and deny coverage for the loss. The
insured did not, in fact, appear when demanded. However,
after the criminal charges against him were dropped for lack
of probable cause, his attorney advised the insurers' attorney
that his client was ready to appear and be examined. This was
met with the reaffirmation by the insurers that the insured had
breached the contract when he failed to appear when de-
manded, and coverage was denied.
The insured then brought suit against the insurers. He al-
12. 9 Cal. 2d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
13. Lines 113-122 of the standard policy, enacted by legislation in most states, so
provide. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 203.01 (1973).
19761
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
leged that the conduct of the insurers caused him severe emo-
tional distress, loss of earnings and other consequential dam-
ages. The insurers' general demurrer was sustained and the
appeal followed.
In Gruenberg the California Supreme Court, as did the in-
termediate appellate court in Richardson, relied heavily on
Crisci. It also extended the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
The duty to so act is imminent in the contract whether the
company is attending to the claims of third persons against
the insured or the claims of the insured itself. Accordingly,
when the insurer unreasonably and in bad faith withholds
payment of the claim of its insured, it is subject to liability
in tort.'"
The insurers attempted to justify their conduct on the
ground that the insured had breached the contract before they
denied coverage. The dissent in this case noted that the insur-
ers had very good reason to take the action complained of by
the insured. It found that the policy provisions authorizing the
insurers to demand examination of the insured concerning the
loss were drafted and enacted by the state's legislature; that
they were construed by the state's supreme court to require
compliance by the insured as a condition precedent to recovery
under the policy; and that they were further construed by the
same court to require the insured's appearance and examina-
tion concerning the loss even though criminal charges stem-
ming from the same loss were pending against the insured."
The majority, however, stated:
we do not say that the parties cannot define, by the terms
of the contract, their respective obligations and duties. We
say merely that no matter how those duties are stated, the
non-performance by one party of its contractual duties can-
not excuse breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
by the other party while the contract between them is in
effect and not rescinded.'"
If California insurers were expecting some clear guidance
from Gruenberg, it certainly was not received. There it was
held that an insurer, which denies coverage based upon advice
14. 9 Cal. 3d at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486 (1973).
15. Id. at 590, 510 P.2d at 1049, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
16. Id. at 578, 510 P.2d at 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
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of counsel, a legislatively-enacted policy provision and clear
interpretation of that provision by the state's highest court
could be held to have breached its duty of good faith and fair
dealing to its insured. In fact, the dissent in Gruenberg gave a
rather perplexing interpretation of what the majority had done:
It is respectfully suggested that the majority have advised an
insurer that if it expects to avoid a Crisci . . lawsuit, there
is only one safe course: Pay all claims and investigate after-
wards, assuming, of course, payment doesn't waive that
right.'7
The California Supreme Court received another chance to
shed some light on this "new tort" of breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing when it considered the case of Silberg v.
California Life Insurance Co. ,8 However, it seemed to do noth-
ing more than reinforce the view of the dissent in Gruenberg
as to the practical effect of that decision.
The plaintiff in Silberg carried a policy issued by the defen-
dant which covered up to $5,000 in medical and hospital expen-
ses. The policy provided that it would not cover "any loss
caused by or resulting from . . . injury or sickness for which
compensation is payable under any Workmen's Compensation
• . . Law." After the plaintiff sustained an injury and made a
claim for policy benefits, the defendant denied benefits be-
cause the plaintiff had also filed a workmen's compensation
claim. The defendant advised him that no decision could be
made on his claim until the compensation claim was deter-
mined. The workmen's compensation carrier also denied the
plaintiffs claim. However, a compromise of the compensation
claim was finally reached and the plaintiff was paid for a por-
tion of the loss sustained. The defendant then advised its in-
sured that the settlement of the compensation claim made its
policy exclusion applicable and that his claim for medical and
hospital benefits was denied.
The plaintiff commenced an action against his insurer on
the contract and also sought damages for alleged physical and
mental distress. He alleged that his insurer was guilty of fraud,
bad faith, and malicious and oppressive conduct. He sought
both compensatory and punitive damages. The trial court,
17. Id. at 592, 510 P.2d at 1049, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
18. 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974).
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without a jury, found that the policy language was ambiguous
and that the plaintiff was entitled to the contract's benefits. A
jury considered the other claims of the plaintiff and awarded
him $75,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive
damages. The trial court granted the insurer's motion for a new
trial finding insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict
and excessive damages.
On appeal by the plaintiff, the California Supreme Court
considered the question of the ambiguity of the policy and
agreed with the trial court. It considered the exclusion in light
of the policy's insuring agreement which obligated the defen-
dant "to pay for loss, except losses covered by any Workmen's
Compensation . . . Law." It reasoned that the insuring agree-
ment, read with the exclusion, could lead to the interpretation
that the policy would provide coverage for any portion of a loss
not paid by workmen's compensation.
Turning to the question of the insurer's liability for breach
of its duty of good faith and fair dealing, the court noted first
the insurer's awareness of the dispute as to whether workmen's
compensation benefits were payable. It said that the defendant
could have paid its benefits and then asserted a lien in the
workmen's compensation proceeding to recover the payments
it had made. The court then held that the action of the insurer
in asserting its right to wait until the workmen's compensation
proceeding was concluded violated, as a matter of law, the duty
of good faith and fair dealing owed to its insured.
B. Damages Flowing From the Breach
Consideration should be given to the type of damages for
which the insurer may be held liable when found to have
breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. As has been
noted, the California courts have held that although the duty
arises by implication from the contract of insurance, its breach
is a tort.
A reading of the cases noted above would indicate that the
California courts will take a rather liberal view of what the
damages stemming from this ill-defined tort will be. They
would appear to cover any "consequential damage" sustained
by the insured proximately caused by the insurer's breach of
its "duty." Clearly included would be damages for the emo-
tional distress sustained by the insured as a result of worry as
to whether his claim will be paid and also resulting from worry
[Vol. 59
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over debts that the insurance benefits might have paid.'9 Dam-
ages for any financial setbacks, such as loss of property, which
the insured is able to trace .to his lack of money because of
nonpayment of the policy's benefits would also appear to be
included .20
Are punitive damages recoverable from an insurer who
breaches its duty of good faith and fair dealing to the insured?
The court in Richardson reasoned that punitive damages are
recoverable. The court recognized the general rule that puni-
tive damages are not generally recoverable for contract
breach. 1 In fact, a California statute provides for the recovery
of such damages only in actions "for breach of an obligation not
arising from contract. '2 The court reasoned that the fact that
the insurer's conduct constituting a tort also involves a breach
of a covenant implied by law in the insurance policy does not
prevent recovery of punitive damages. 23 It is interesting to note
the semantic exercise engaged in by the court to avoid the
California Code's prohibition against awarding punitive dam-
ages. The court first tells us that the duty ("obligation") of
good faith and fair dealing is implied in ("arises from") every
insurance contract. Yet, the court says, since the breach of the
duty ("obligation") amounts to a tort, recovery of punitive
damages is allowed since the insured's action is "for breach of
an obligation not arising from contract" within the meaning of
its code provision. Be that as it may, the California Supreme
Court in Silberg provided at least some form of limitation when
it announced that mere breach of the insurer's duty is not
enough to subject it to liability for punitive damages in that
state. The insurer must also be found guilty of fraud, oppres-
sion or malice and must have acted with the intent to vex,
injure or annoy, or with conscious disregard for the plaintiff's
rights .24
19. "Since in the instant case we are concerned with mental distress resulting from
a substantial invasion of property interests of the insured and not with the independent
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, we deem Section 46 [RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS] to be inapplicable." Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566,
580, 510 P.2d 1032, 1041, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 489 (1973).
20. Id.
21. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 342 (1932).
22. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970).
23. 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 245, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547, 556 (1972).
24. 11 Cal. 3d at 462, 521 P.2d at 110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718 (1974).
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C. The Non-California View
At least for now the "new tort" of breach of a duty of good
faith and fair dealing appears to be limited in application to
California. In Drake v. Milwaukee MutualInsurance Co.,25 for
example, the insured claimed that the insurer was guilty of
"tortious breach of contract" for failing to honor her uninsured
motorist coverage claim. In assessing the situation the court
held that the insurer's denial was, at most, due to a then argua-
ble interpretation of Wisconsin law as to whether the potential
tort liability of someone other than the uninsured motorist to
the insured would block an uninsured motorist coverage recov-
ery. The court held that if there is a genuine dispute over the
status of the law when the denial of coverage is made, it cannot
be said that the denial of coverage was made in bad faith.
Another uninsured motorist case, Baxter v. Royal Indemn-
ity Co.,6 had facts almost identical to Richardson. In what
appeared to be a clear case of liability, the insurer forced the
insureds to resort to arbitration before uninsured motorist ben-
efits were finally paid. The insureds sought damages over and
above the benefits provided by the policy claiming that the
insurer's action was motivated by bad faith, self-interest, mal-
ice and spite. The Florida court specifically disapproved of the
rule in Richardson. It held that, unlike the position of the in-
surer as a fiduciary of the insured as respects a liability insur-
ance policy when a claim is made against the insured, the
insurer and insured in an uninsured motorist claim situation
are contractual adversaries. Noting that the policy provided for
arbitration should the insurer and insured disagree as to the
claim, the court stated:
It is difficult to rationalize how either party could be charged
with the commission of a tort merely because it elected to
exercise a lawful option open to it under the contract. If a
party to a contract exercises an option given to it by the clear
and lawful terms thereof, it would appear immaterial
whether such election was motivated by good faith, bad faith,
self-interest, spite, or indifference.Y
25. 70 Wis. 2d 977, 236 N.W.2d 204 (1975).
26. 285 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1973), writ of cert. discharged 317 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1975).
27. 285 So. 2d 652, 656 (Fla. App. 1973).
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II. THE CALIFORNIA FALLOUT
It would be 'relatively easy to dismiss cases such as Sitberg,
Richardson and Gruenberg as nothing more than three addi-
tional examples of attempts by California appellate courts to
redistribute the nation's wealth by employing their concepts of
good social policy rather than sound, well-articulated, legal
reasoning. That approach, however, would provide little solace
to insurers who wish to deal fairly with their insureds without
also throwing open the corporate coffers to all comers and
thereby possibly exposing their officers and directors to liabil-
ity to stockholders and policyholders for mismanagement.
Unfortunately, little solace can be drawn from the Califor-
nia cases discussed in this article - except, perhaps, that lia-
bility for what it now calls "bad faith" does not, ipso facto, also
expose an insurer to liability for punitive damages. What these
cases say is that "bad faith" may amount to nothing more than
an honest mistake in judgment. Mistakes in judgment may
amount to nothing more than a sincere belief that a policy
provision is clear and thus prevents recovery by the insured. Of
course, under the new view of "bad faith" the mistake in judg-
ment may also amount to something as reckless as denying
coverage because of reliance upon prior interpretations of the
policy provisions by the jurisdiction's highest court. What the
California courts are telling insurers operating in that state is
that they will be absolutely liable for their insureds' consequen-
tial damages if an honest mistake in judgment results in the
failure to pay a claim which, upon hindsight, should have been
paid.
The dissent in Gruenberg may have been correct in inter-
preting the majority's opinion to mean that the only way for
insurers to avoid the liability stemming from the "new tort" is
for them to adopt a "pay now and investigate later" approach.
One would hope the dissent is wrong, but it is hard to read the
opinions any other way. However, as also noted by the
Gruenberg dissent, an insurer which adopts that approach may
be held to have waived the right to recover back what it had
paid. There is authority for the position that an insurer which
makes a payment under a policy, after a possible defense has
been called to its attention and after foregoing further investi-
gation of that defense, does not make the payment under a
"mistake in fact" and is not entitled to recover back the pay-
1976]
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ment.5 Also, it is an accepted rule of restitution that even
where payment is made under a mistake in fact, the payment
may not be recovered back if there has been such a change in
the position of the payee that it would be unjust to require him
to make a full refund.29
The California courts have created this "new tort" in an
obvious attempt to afford more protection to insureds. How-
ever, it has not really been established that there is a need of
this additional protection. Each day disputes arise between
parties to contracts as to their respective rights and obliga-
tions. Each day these disputes are resolved in our courts or, if
the contracts so provide, by arbitration. Why should an insured
be afforded remedies for contract breach which are not afforded
to parties under other forms of contracts? The tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress is available to protect the
insured should the insurer's claims handling procedures be
truly oppressive and outrageous. State insurance departments
are intended to serve the public and handle complaints from
insureds as to insurer practices on a regular basis. Likewise,
state legislatures are capable of prohibiting what are consid-
ered to be unfair claims handling practices and of imposing
penalties for violations. 3
It is suggested that other courts should carefully consider
the ramifications involved before adopting California's new
tort of "insurer's mistaken judgment." It is also suggested that
the California court should reconsider what it has done. It
should at least clarify, at the earliest possible opportunity, the
precise nature of this tort. If it feels no obligation to insurers
in the state who wish to deal fairly with their insureds and
avoid this excess liability, it should consider the insurance-
buying public that will ultimately pay for the cost of the new
tort of "insurer's mistaken judgment."
28. See, e.g., Meeme Mut. H.P.F. Ins. Co. v. Lorfeld, 194 Wis. 322, 216 N.W. 507
(1927).
29. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 69(1) (1936).
30. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners has developed a "Model
Unfair Claims Practices Settlement Act." See, e.g., Houser, supra note 9 at 534.
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